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CARING FOR THE INCAPACITATED-A CASE FOR
NONPROFIT SURROGATE DECISION MAKERS IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY*
Linda S. Whitton**
Present demographic patterns of disability in our aging society her-
ald a rising need for surrogates to make personal and financial deci-
sions for those who have lost the capacity to manage their own affairs.'
The inadequacy of our present guardianship system to meet rising sur-
rogate decision-making needs continues to receive attention in both le-
gal and sociological literature. Common criticisms include the expense
and time-consuming nature of the guardianship process, not only for
the ward and guardian, but also for societal and judicial resources.2
Guardianship is also faulted on substantive grounds as overly restric-
tive and poorly supervised, thus undermining the well-being of the
ward it was ostensibly designed to protect.$
One legislative response to the inadequacies of guardianship was the
creation of durable property and health-care powers that a competent
individual may delegate to the agent of his or her choice so that guard-
ianship is unnecessary in the event of later incapacity.4 However, the
* Copyright © 1995 by Linda S. Whitton. All rights reserved.
** Associate Professor, Valparaiso University School of Law.
1. No comprehensive collection of data exists to track exactly how many individuals are
presently served by a surrogate decision maker via either guardianship or durable powers of
attorney. However, demographic projections of the rate of incapacitation among the elderly as
well as widespread anecdotal evidence support the general consensus that the need for surrogate
decision makers is significantly rising. See GEORGE H. ZIMNY & JUDITH A. DIAMOND, ST.
Louis UNIV. HEALTH SCIENCES CTR., SOCIAL SERVICE AGENCIES AS GUARDIANS OF ELD-
ERLY WARDS 1-2 (1994); see also Aida Rogers, In Search of Volunteer Guardians, SHEPARD'S
ELDERCARE/LAw NEWSL., Sept. 1994, at I (noting that the need for surrogates is a problem
national in scope); SUBCOMM. ON HOUSING AND CONSUMER INTERESTS, HOUSE SELECT
COMM. ON AGING, SURROGATE DECISIONMAKING FOR ADULTS: MODEL STANDARDS TO EN-
SURE QUALITY GUARDIANSHIP AND REPRESENTATIVE PAYEESHIP SERVICES, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 1, at 20 (Comm. Print 1989) (Don Bonker, Chairman) [hereinafter HOUSE COMM.
MODEL STANDARDS]; infra notes 7-16 and accompanying text.
2. Alison P. Barnes, Beyond Guardianship Reform: A Reevaluation of Autonomy and Be-
neficence for a System of Principled Decision-Making in Long Term Care, 41 EMORY L.J. 633,
688-90 (1992); see also John J. Lombard, Jr., Asset Management Under a Durable Power of
Attorney-The Ideal Solution to Guardianships or Conservatorships, 9 PROB. NOTES 189, 189-
91 (1983).
3. Lawrence A. Frolik, Abusive Guardians and the Need for Judicial Supervision, TR. &
EST., July 1991, at 41. Although limited guardianship for partially incapacitated individuals is
legislatively available in most states, plenary guardianship remains the norm most likely because
of the additional time and effort required of court personnel, counsel, experts, and the parties in
a limited guardianship proceeding. Barnes, supra note 2, at 648-49.
4. Every state, as well as the District of Columbia, has some type of general durable power
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effectiveness of durable powers as an alternative to guardianship
presumes public awareness of the durable powers option as well as the
existence of competent, trustworthy agents to whom the powers can be
delegated. Based on current statistical projections,5 a growing shortage
of qualified individuals to serve as either agents under durable powers
or as guardians may seriously undermine care of the incapacitated in
the twenty-first century.
The purpose of this Article is to examine the increasing need for
surrogate decision makers and to explore the concept of permitting
competent individuals to appoint nonprofit organizations as agents
under durable powers when an appropriate individual is unavailable
to serve in that capacity. Although corporate fiduciaries are commonly
delegated financial durable powers and trust powers, this practice has
not yet extended to delegation of powers over the person, such as
health-care authority. Many state statutes do permit, however, court
appointment of corporate guardians over both the estate and person of
incapacitated individuals.' This Article proposes expanding the options
for delegation of durable health-care powers to include nonprofit
agents so that competent persons who are without appropriate individ-
ual agents may still avoid guardianship through the privileges of self-
determination afforded by durable powers.
To support this proposal, Section I of this Article provides current
data that demonstrate the growing unmet need for surrogate decision
legislation for the delegation of property-related powers, and nearly every state expressly per-
mits the delegation of health-care powers through a durable power of attorney or medical agent
appointment. For a comprehensive list of statutory citations, see Linda S. Whitton, Durable
Powers as a Hedge Against Guardianship: Should the Attorney-at-Law Accept Appointment as
Attorney-in-Fact?, 2 ELDER L.J. 39, 40-41 & n.5, 46 & nn.39-40 (1994).
5. See infra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
6. In 1971, Ohio was the forerunner in the corporate guardianship movement when it
passed House Bill 290, which established procedures for corporate guardianship of mentally
retarded citizens. See John M. Seelig & Sandra R. Chesnut, Corporate Legal Guardianship:
An Innovative Concept in Advocacy and Protective Services, 31 Soc. WORK 221 (1986). Now,
the National Guardianship Association, a nonprofit national organization formed in 1988, has
approximately 480 members, 164 of which are corporations. Telephone Interview with Joan
Gray, Association Manager, National Guardianship Association (Sept. 5, 1995) [hereinafter
Telephone Interview with Joan Gray].
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-2A-104.1 (b) (1992) (recognizing the judicial designation of pri-
vate nonprofit corporations as guardians for persons with developmental disabilities); IND. CODE
ANN. §§ 29-3-1-6, -12 (Burns 1989 & Supp. 1995) (recognizing both nonprofit and for-profit
corporations as "persons" eligible for court appointment as guardians over the person or prop-
erty of an incapacitated person); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 102 (Supp. 1993) (recognizing
both individual and corporate fiduciaries for the care and management of the estate and person
of an incapacitated individual); Guardianship of Bassett, 385 N.E.2d 1024, 1028-29 (Mass. Ct.
App. 1979) (holding that the court had statutory authority to approve as guardian a nonprofit
corporation that exercised guardianship powers through a committee).
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makers. Section II follows with a description of the theoretical bases
for meeting this need with nonprofit organizations, and Section III as-
sesses what characteristics of nonprofit corporate guardianship pro-
grams merit consideration for a system of private delegation of durable
powers to nonprofit agents. Finally, Section IV evaluates how permit-
ting nonprofit corporate agents to accept both property and health-care
powers could improve the overall structure of surrogate decision mak-
ing in an aging society.
I. THE NEED FOR SURROGATE DECISION MAKERS
Absent the gift of clairvoyance, it is impossible to know with cer-
tainty how many Americans will become incapacitated, and of that
number, how many will be without a close friend or relative who could
serve as a surrogate decision maker. Incapacitation can result from un-
expected acute illness or injury as well as long-term degenerative con-
ditions. Consequently, every competent individual is, to some degree,
vulnerable to the possibility of needing a surrogate decision maker.
Researchers have discovered, however, that the probability of inca-
pacitation increases with age. While actual life expectancy has in-
creased, the expectancy of life without disability-or "active" life ex-
pectancy-has not." Furthermore, current medical science holds out
little hope that the chronic, nonlethal degenerative diseases of old age
can be significantly prevented or delayed.8
Surveys of the ability of elderly persons living in noninstitutional
settings to handle personal and home care activities without assistance
indicate that approximately fifteen percent of those age sixty-five to
sixty-nine report difficulty with one or more such activities and that
this percentage rises to forty-nine percent for persons eighty-five years
or older.9 Statistically, the over age eighty-five group is also the most
likely to suffer from disability or impaired function due to chronic dis-
ease.10 Adding to the predictive significance of these probabilities is the
fact that the population over age eighty-five is currently the fastest
7. GERIATRIC MEDICINE 16 (Christine K. Cassel et al. eds., 2d ed. 1990).
8. Id. at 22.
9. SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, AGING AMERICA: TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS
(Annotated) 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 84-85 (Comm. Print 1990) (revised by Elizabeth Vierck)
[hereinafter SPECIAL COMM.].
10. GERIATRIC MEDICINE, supra note 7, at 17; see SPECIAL COMM., supra note 9, at 91
("[Tlhose 85 and older have a three-fold greater risk of losing their independence, seven times
the chance of entering a nursing home, and two-and-a-half times the risk of dying compared to
persons 65 to 74 years of age.").
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growing in the nation." Between 1980 and 2030, the percentage of
persons eighty-five years old and older is expected to triple.'"
Although not all disabling conditions are severe enough to necessi-
tate surrogate decision making, consideration alone of the statistical in-
cidence of Alzheimer's disease-a degenerative disease whose primary
symptom is the impairment of cognitive function-is sobering. Studies
show that organic mental disorders such as Alzheimer's disease affect
more than six percent of older adults."3 In 1980, more than two mil-
lion individuals had Alzheimer's disease.' 4 That number is expected to
increase to four million by the turn of the century and to between eight
million and ten million by 2050 unless a cure or preventative measures
are discovered. 5
Clairvoyance aside, a reasonable conclusion based on the foregoing
statistical probabilities is that the need for surrogate decision makers is
going to increase significantly during the next fifty years. Already in
1988, a congressional report noted a plea from courts and social service
agencies for more surrogate decision makers.' 6 The key question is:
Who will serve as these needed surrogate decision makers?
Traditionally, guardianship authority and durable powers have been
vested in a relative of an incapacitated person. 7 However, such indi-
viduals are becoming less plentiful due to decreasing fertility rates, ris-
ing divorce and nonmarriage rates, and increasing geographic mobility
among young adults.'" By 2030, 21.8 percent of the population is ex-
pected to be over the age of sixty-five as compared to only thirteen
percent at the turn of the century. 9 Thus, the aggregate potential net-
11. SPECIAL COMM., supra note 9, at 7.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 83.
14. GERIATRIC MEDICINE, supra note 7, at 24.
15. Id.
16. HOUSE SUBCOMM. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at iii.
17. ZIMNY & DIAMOND, supra note 1, at 1 ("The traditional and principal source from
which courts appoint guardians is individual family members, particularly daughters, of elderly
persons."); Patricia E. Salkin, The Durable Power of Attorney: Guarding Against Abuse,
SHEPARD'S ELDERCARE/LAw NEWSLETTER, Sept. 1994, at 16 (noting that agents are often a
family member or close friend, but a close degree of relationship is not required for delegation
of durable powers).
18. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1994 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES No. 90, 75 (114th ed. 1994) (comparing rates of live births, deaths, marriages, and
divorces from 1950 to 1992); Martha N. Ozawa, Solitude in Old Age: Effects of Female Head-
ship on Elderly Women's Lives, 8 AFFILIA 136 (1993) (analyzing how demographic shifts and
the increasing rates of divorce and nonmarriage among women will affect women's responses to
the demands of others for care as well as their own needs for care); David J. Dewit et al.,
Physical Distance and Social Contact Between Elders and Their Adult Children, 10 RESEARCH
ON AGING 56 (1988) (studying the effects of proximity on family relationships).
19. SPECIAL COMM., supra note 9, at 3.
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work of younger people who could assist incapacitated elderly is
shrinking. Even for those elderly who live alone, but have children or
siblings, surrogate decision making by family members may be imprac-
tical due to geographic separation.2
In the first survey of its kind, The Commonwealth Fund Commis-
sion on Elderly People Living Alone discovered that approximately
thirty percent of elderly Americans live alone in an independent house-
hold.2' The majority of these individuals are women who have outlived
their husbands.22 Women comprised seventy-seven percent of the eld-
erly living alone in 1988, and that percentage is expected to rise to
eighty-five percent by 2020.23 Although the total proportion of elderly
who live alone is not expected to increase, the sheer numbers of elderly
living alone will double due to the anticipated overall aging of the pop-
ulation base.24
The survey also discovered that a much higher percentage of "older"
elderly-those over age eighty-five-live alone than do those age sixty-
five to seventy-four (almost fifty percent for the former group com-
pared to twenty-five percent for the latter).25 Thus, the segment of the
population that is statistically most likely to suffer disabling conditions
and impaired function is also the most likely to be living alone.
Whether these individuals will have someone to assist them if they can
no longer manage their personal and financial matters is an essential
inquiry for purposes of planning an adequate surrogate decision-mak-
ing system.
Of the elderly people living alone who responded to the survey,
twenty-seven percent stated that they had no living child or sibling. 6
With respect to having someone on whom they could depend in times
of need, twenty-eight percent of the respondents stated that they had
no one to help them even for a few weeks, and eighteen percent stated
that they had no one on whom to depend even for a few days.27 Given
that the poverty rate is almost five times higher for elderly living alone
than for elderly couples,28 purchasing needed assistance may not be an
20. ZIMNY & DIAMOND, supra note 1, at 2; HOUSE SUBCOMM. MODEL STANDARDS,
supra note 1, at 6.
21. THE COMMONWEALTH FUND COMMISSION ON ELDERLY PEOPLE LIVING ALONE,
AGING ALONE: PROFILES AND PROJECTIONS 22, 26 (1988).
22. Id. at 23, 27-28.
23. Id. at 31.
24. Id. at 30.
25. Id. at 26.
26. Id. at 67.
27. Id. at 62.
28. Id. at 36. Furthermore, the poverty rate among those living alone is not expected to
decline in the next 10 years. Id. at 37.
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alternative for elderly who live alone and are without a supportive net-
work of friends or family.
Looking then at only the segment of the population that statistically
is the most likely to become incapacitated, it appears that the number
of elderly who may need surrogate decision makers will continue to
increase along with the probability that neither family nor friends will
be available to provide assistance. Of course, elderly living alone are
not the only population for whom surrogate decision making may be-
come necessary. Both members of an elderly couple may become inca-
pacitated, not to mention the number of younger adults who may find
themselves unexpectedly incapacitated and without a spouse or chil-
dren to provide assistance.29 Although the anticipated needs of the eld-
erly are easier to quantify than for younger individuals, a system for
surrogate decision making must be adequate to accommodate the needs
of all incapacitated individuals, regardless of age.
II. THEORETICAL BASES FOR NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS AS
SURROGATE DECISION MAKERS
As noted in the introduction, nonprofit corporations have already be-
gun to play a significant role in meeting society's need for surrogate
decision makers, but in a default manner through court appointment as
guardians rather than in a directed fashion as preappointed agents
under durable powers. Before evaluating what characteristics of non-
profit corporate guardianship programs merit consideration for a sys-
tem of advance delegation of durable powers, the first question that
must be answered is: Why prefer a nonprofit form of corporate entity
over a for-profit form for surrogate decision making?
A. Nonprofits as the Third Sector
Although Americans have formed voluntary associations since early
colonial times to provide for unmet societal needs,3" it was not until the
29. Consider, for example, that two of the most widely publicized surrogate decision-mak-
ing cases concerned young women. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261
(1990) (30-year-old woman in a persistent vegetative state resulting from injuries sustained in
an automobile accident); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.) (21-year-old woman in a persis-
tent vegetative state from undetermined causes), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). Demo-
graphic shifts and increasing divorce and nonmarriage rates among women suggest that in the
coming decades growing numbers of women will live alone and may not have surrogate decision
makers available in the event of incapacitation. See Ozawa, supra note 18, at 148-50.
30. W. Andrew Achenbaum, A Brief History of Foundation Funding in Aging, in AGING:
THE BURDEN STUDY OF FOUNDATION GRANTMAKING TRENDS 17-18 (Loren Renz ed., 1991).
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1980s that legal theorists attempted an economic analysis of why non-
profits exist and how they operate. Professor Henry B. Hansmann's
seminal article, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise,"1 was the first to
analyze nonprofits as a response to market failure in the for-profit sec-
tor. Based on the premise that a properly functioning market is one
where profit-seeking firms supply services at the quantity and price
that represent maximum social efficiency, Hansmann postulated that
the market will fail when consumers are incapable of evaluating the
services promised or delivered.32  This market failure, which
Hansmann labeled "contract failure," occurs because the lack of con-
sumer monitoring places unfettered discretion in the hands of profit-
seeking producers who can then engage in opportunistic behavior such
as charging excessive prices for inferior services. 33
Examples of contract failure include transactions where the recipient
of the service and the purchaser are different individuals (for example,
services rendered to the needy, but paid for by others); as well as situa-
tions where the recipient-purchaser of the service is in a poor position
to police the quality of what is received or to shop for alternatives (for
example, nursing care provided to the infirm or day care provided to
children). 4 In these contract failure contexts, the checks-and-balances
function of the normal marketplace cannot operate successfully because
the consumer has lost the ability to monitor the producer.
Where contract failure applies, Hansmann hypothesized that the
public will prefer nonprofit entities because the consumer is protected
by a broader contract-the legal commitment, which a nonprofit or-
ganization must make in exchange for tax-exempt status, to reinvest
any net earnings in the provision of the nonprofit's services, rather
than distribute those profits to persons who control the enterprise.3 5
Hansmann theorized that this "contractual" restraint on profit distri-
bution, based on and enforced under state and federal law, lessens the
importance of the consumer's lack of ability to police the producer. In
other words, the economic efficiencies of the collective contract between
the nonprofit organization and the state, for the benefit of the organi-
zation's patrons, compensates for the patrons' lack of contractual
power on an individual level.3 6
31. Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835 (1980).
32. Id. at 843-45.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 846-47, 862-65.
35. Id. at 844 (noting, however, that "in spite of the limitations imposed upon them, non-
profits may succeed in distributing some of their net earnings through inflated salaries,... and
other forms of excess payments").
36. Id. at 853.
19961
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Hansmann also distinguished nonprofits according to their sources
of financing as either donative or commercial."1 Donative nonprofits
are those that receive most of their income from donations or grants,
such as organizations that provide relief to the needy. Commercial
nonprofits are those that charge a fee for the service provided to the
consumer, such as organizations that provide nursing care, health care,
and day care. Of course, these categories are not mutually exclusive, as
in the case of universities, for example, which rely on a varying mix of
consumer-provided tuition and donations to fund their activities. 8
Although the restraint on net profit distribution is, under
Hansmann's theory, the essential characteristic that provides nonprofits
with a niche in an otherwise for-profit world, it is also a limiting factor
that prevents at least commercial nonprofits from squeezing their for-
profit counterparts from the marketplace.3 9 When donations and re-
tained earnings are poorly matched to the capital needs of a nonprofit
organization, the nonprofit organization cannot sell equity shares to
raise additional capital as can for-profit enterprises. 0 Moreover, if
profit distribution is a primary motivation for efficient production and
market responsiveness, then the absence of profit motivation may make
nonprofits less vigilant and responsive than their for-profit competi-
tors.41 Based on these considerations, Hansmann concluded that non-
profit firms will only have a competitive edge where the protective
value of the prohibition on profit distribution outweighs its
disadvantages."2
In the development of an economic theory of nonprofit enterprise,
the role of government has also received considerable attention.43 The
"government failure" theory recognizes that the government or public
sector, in addition to the commercial or private sector, supplies signifi-
cant goods and services to the consuming public, but that not all goods
and services are provided governmentally or privately. 44 This theory
states that the level of government-provided services is determined by
the voting process and that the political process always leaves a signifi-
37. Id. at 840-41.
38. Id. at 841.
39. Id. at 871-79.
40. Id. at 877.
41. Id. at 878.
42. Id. at 879.
43. See generally Burton A. Weisbrod, Toward a Theory of the Voluntary Nonprofit Sec-
tor in a Three-Sector Economy, in THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS 21 (Susan
Rose-Ackerman ed., 1986); JAMES DOUGLAS, WHY CHARITY? (1983).
44. Weisbrod, supra note 43, at 22 (explaining the development of a voluntary, or non-
profit, sector as "an adjustment to the restricted capabilities of the other two sectors").
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cant number of unsatisfied voters who may then turn to the nonprofit
sector as one option for supplying the additional level of service de-
sired." The combination of the market failure and government failure
theories, deemed the "twin failure theory," 46 heralds nonprofit enter-
prise as the "third sector," which exists to accommodate public de-
mand when neither the commercial nor government sectors can re-
spond with an adequate supply of the desired service.
Most economic analyses of nonprofits offer some variation on the
twin failure theme. One recent theory, however, argues that the twin
failure theory is incomplete because it neglects to consider the role of
altruism inherent in the existence and behavior of the nonprofit sec-
tor.4 The "altruism" theory suggests that a truly nonprofit enterprise
operates from a conscious concern for "need" instead of as a purely
derivative response to failure of the public and private sectors to meet
demand.4 In other words, according to the altruism theory, the non-
profit sector also functions prospectively, rather than just reactively to
failures in the commercial and government sectors.
For purposes of this Article it is neither necessary nor particularly
helpful to attempt a reconciliation of the various economic theories of
nonprofit enterprise. Each, however, as a perspective on the relation-
ship among the nonprofit, private, and public sectors, provides insight
for developing a systematic approach to caring for the incapacitated.
Heretofore the term "need" has been used nonspecifically in this Arti-
cle to describe the growing requirement for more surrogate decision
makers. In order to evaluate this requirement from an economic per-
spective, an attempt must now be made to differentiate between the
"demand" and the "need" for surrogate decision making.
B. Surrogate Decision Making-Marketplace Demand Versus
Need
Most guardianship statutes reflect the historical tradition of, and
preference for, a family member serving as an incapacitated person's
45. Id. at 26-32.
46. See DOUGLAS, supra note 43, at 160.
47. See generally Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REV.
501 (1990). It is interesting to note that in 1983, James Douglas concluded that the "twin
failures argument" was only a beginning point for a rationale of the "Third Sector," and identi-
fied among the important unanswered questions the role of altruism in society. DOUGLAS, supra
note 43, at 160.
48. Atkinson, supra note 47, at 638 (noting that "the invisible hand of the market, operat-
ing without regard to need, is not the ideal, but a necessary stopgap where the helping hand of
altruism, implementing conscious concern for need, has not yet reached").
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surrogate decision maker. Relatives, if available and willing to serve,
have priority for court appointment as a guardian unless challenged as
unfit for the position."9 Although there are no national comparative
data to show the respective percentages of family members or close
friends who have served as volunteer guardians compared to strangers
appointed at the behest of the court, the fact that corporate guardian-
ship services are a relatively recent phenomenon suggests that family
members and friends once provided a basically adequate source of sur-
rogate decision making.50
Under a family-based guardianship system, if a person loses the ca-
pacity to manage personal or financial affairs, it is assumed that the
relative of closest relationship will seek court appointment to supervise
the care of the incapacitated individual. This type of voluntary surro-
gacy is ostensibly motivated by emotional commitment or moral obliga-
tion stemming from the family relationship rather than economic moti-
vation. Although guardianship statutes may provide for reasonable
compensation to guardians for services rendered,"' usually relatives
serve without compensation. Regardless, the court does not conduct a
49. The Uniform Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act, which has been adopted
in substantial part by fourteen states and the District of Columbia, contains the following typi-
cal specifications for who may serve as a guardian and the priorities for selection among quali-
fied candidates:
§ 2-205. Who May be Guardian; Priorities.
(a) Any qualified person may be appointed guardian of an incapacitated person.
(b) Unless lack of qualification or other good cause dictates the contrary, the
Court shall appoint a guardian in accordance with the incapacitated person's most
recent nomination in a durable power of attorney.
(c) Except as provided in subsection (b), the following are entitled to consideration
for appointment in the order listed:
(1) the spouse of the incapacitated person or a person nominated by will of a
deceased spouse or by other writing signed by the spouse and attested by at least 2
witnesses;
(2) an adult child of the incapacitated person;
(3) a parent of the incapacitated person, or a person nominated by will of a
deceased parent or by other writing signed by a parent and attested by at least two
witnesses;
(4) any relative of the incapacitated person with whom the person has resided
for more than 6 months prior to the filing of the petition; and
(5) a person nominated by the person who is caring for or paying for the care
of the incapacitated person.
(d) With respect to persons having equal priority, the Court shall select the one it
deems best qualified to serve. The Court, acting in the best interest of the incapac-
itated person, may pass over a person having priority and appoint a person having
a lower priority or no priority.
UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP AND PROTECTIVE PROC. ACT § 2-205, 8A U.L.A. 489-90 (1993) [here-
inafter UGPPA].
50. ZIMNY & DIAMOND, supra note 1, at 3.
51. See UGPPA, supra note 49, §§ 2-209 & 2-109(d).
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search for the individual offering the best service at the lowest price,
but only inquires as to whether the petitioner for guardianship powers
is the most appropriate individual of those willing to serve. 52
Thus, when the requirement for a surrogate decision maker is met
by a willing volunteer, the process falls outside the commercial market-
place of supply and demand. Availability of suitable volunteers, rather
than the operation of an efficient market, determines who will render
surrogacy services. Borrowing from the altruism theory of nonprofit
enterprise, the acts of volunteer guardians could be described as inci-
dents of individual altruism, prompted not as a derivative response to
the lack of a marketplace alternative, but motivated by the belief that
surrogate decision making by a relative or friend of the incapacitated
person is superior to a commercially-provided surrogate. The require-
ment for surrogacy in this instance then is more appropriately viewed
as a "need" rather than as a "demand" asserted in the marketplace.
The same rationale could be applied to the voluntary delegation of
durable powers to a family member or friend by a competent person
prior to incapacity. Although agents under durable powers, like guard-
ians, may be entitled to compensation for their services, in reality most
family members and friends serve without remuneration."3 The role
played by this type of individual altruism is especially significant in
situations where the incapacitated individual has no private resources
with which alternative surrogacy services could be hired, or as is fre-
quently the case, what financial resources there once were become de-
pleted by the costly custodial and health care often necessitated by
incapacity. 4
However, where no volunteer family member or close friend exists
to respond altruistically to the "need" for surrogate decision making,
either as an agent under durable powers or as a guardian, does the
resulting requirement for a surrogate represent a marketplace "de-
mand" or a "need" outside the operation of an efficient market? The
answer to this question would appear to rest primarily on the financial
resources of the incapacitated person.
For indigent persons who have no resources with which to purchase
surrogate decision-making services, the requirement for a surrogate can
52. Id. § 2-205(d).
53. 1 FRANCIS J. COLLIN, JR. ET AL., DRAFTING THE DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY:
A SYSTEMS APPROACH 80 (1992).
54. A 1991 documentary on financing the costs of long term care estimated that it takes the
average single person only 13 weeks to exhaust enough personal savings and assets to become
eligible for Medicaid when paying for long-term care in a nursing home and the average couple
only 20 weeks. Frontline: Who Pays for Mom and Dad? (PBS television broadcast, Apr. 30,
1991).
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hardly be viewed as a demand to be satisfied in the marketplace. On
the contrary, when individual volunteers are unavailable to provide
surrogate decision making for indigent persons, the "need" for surro-
gacy is one felt reluctantly, and by default, in the public sector. A 1993
survey of public guardianship statutes indicates that public guardian-
ship of some type is available in forty-three states.55 However, in many
states, a government employee is appointed as a guardian of last resort,
with no formal program of support services to ensure that the incapac-
itated person receives care in a manner that is most appropriate and
least restrictive." At the time of the survey, only seven states had an
independent state agency established for the purpose of providing sur-
rogacy services, twelve provided public guardianship through a govern-
ment agency which also provided other social services, and twelve
states handled public guardianship through contracts with nongovern-
ment providers.57 From the survey results, it appears that of the states
that contract with nongovernment entities for guardianship services,
most deal with nonprofit organizations.5" Based on economic theory,
the fact that nonprofit organizations exist to handle this type of need
could be viewed as a response to the lack of enough guardianship ser-
vices by government personnel and agencies (the government failure
theory), or as a collective altruistic response to a need that cannot be
effectively expressed in the marketplace as consumer demand (the al-
truism theory).
If, however, an individual can afford to pay for guardianship ser-
vices, the search for a guardian is one that, arguably, can be expressed
in the marketplace as consumer demand. Depending on the jurisdic-
tion, the options may range from individual professional guardians to
organizations, nonprofit and for-profit, which have established pro-
grams for providing guardianship services. Although a competent per-
son could ostensibly shop and compare to find the organization that
appears to offer quality guardianship service at the best price, the em-
pirical reality is that competent individuals generally do not shop for
guardianship services before they are required. And once guardianship
services are required, the incapacitated consumer is no longer in a po-
sition to shop for or monitor the quality of the service received. For
these reasons, fee-based surrogate decision-making services present a
55. Dorothy Siemon et al., Public Guardianship: Where Is It and What Does It Need?, 27
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 588, 594 (1993).
56. Id. at 594-98 (noting one case in Alabama where a sheriff was not even aware that he
had been appointed as a guardian for a woman in a mental hospital until advocates began
helping the ward contest her wrongful commitment there).
57. Id. at 594.
58. Id. at 590-93.
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classic example of Hansmann's contract failure scenario.
Despite the inability of incapacitated persons to monitor the quality
of their own surrogate decision-making services, nonprofit guardians
do not have an exclusive market in the corporate guardianship arena.
Although there are no quantitative statistics that compare the number
of for-profit corporate guardianship programs with nonprofit pro-
grams, the predominance of nonprofit programs discussed in recent ar-
ticles and studies suggests that they are in the majority. 9 Nonetheless,
the role of for-profit surrogate decision makers merits careful consider-
ation in the formulation of any recommendation for expanding the per-
missible types of agents to whom durable powers may be delegated.
The question that legislators must consider is whether states should
permit their citizens to delegate durable health-care powers to corpo-
rate agents, and if so, whether these corporate agents should be limited
to nonprofit organizations.
Hansmann's theory hypothesizes that the marketplace will adjust it-
self according to the relative advantages and disadvantages of the non-
profit versus for-profit form of organization in contract failure situa-
tions. If the prohibition on profit distribution is of great importance to
the consumer or purchaser of surrogate decision-making services, then
nonprofit providers should prevail; if, however, a factor such as flexi-
bility in raising sufficient capital resources is more important than
nondistribution of profit, then for-profit providers will remain viable in
the market.60
However, the underlying premise of Hansmann's theory-that con-
sumers discern the differences between nonprofit and for-profit enter-
prise-has been criticized as unsupported by actual marketplace be-
havior.61 A telephone survey was conducted in the New Haven,
Connecticut metropolitan area to test the contract failure theory.62 The
objective was to determine whether consumers actually perceive differ-
ences between nonprofit and for-profit organizations and whether the
nonprofit versus for-profit distinction influences patronage. Among the
59. See generally Rogers, supra note 1; ZIMNY & DIAMOND, supra note 1; Siemon et al.,
supra note 55; see also Penelope A. Hommel & Lauren B. Lisi, Model Standards for Guardi-
anship: Ensuring Quality Surrogate Decision Making Services, 23 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 433,
435 (1989) ("Private entities tend to be not-for-profit, although for-profit organizations and sole
proprietorships using a fee-for-service arrangement appear to be on the rise.").
60. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
61. Steven E. Permut, Consumer Perceptions of Nonprofit Enterprise: A Comment on
Hansmann, 90 YALE L.J. 1623 (1981) (suggesting that several assumptions implicit in
Hansmann's theory must be reexamined).
62. Id. at 1626-27 (based on a response from 225 households out of a random sample of
338 households).
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results, thirty-five percent of the respondents did not perceive any dif-
ference between nonprofit and for-profit organizations, fifty-six percent
did not feel, or were uncertain, that nonprofits would treat them more
fairly than for-profits, and thirty percent did not feel that nonprofits
would be more concerned with them as a person than for-profits.6
With respect to whether the respondents would prefer a nonprofit or-
ganization for an elderly relative's nursing home care, sixty-eight per-
cent responded that they would not care if the nursing home was
nonprofit. 6"
If there is in fact ambivalence or ignorance on the part of the con-
suming public about nonprofit/for-profit distinctions, perhaps the most
important question for future planning is whether the differences
should matter. In the corporate guardianship context, legislatures and
social service agencies often have greater influence over the design of
the guardianship system than consumers of guardianship services. One
possible explanation for the existence of for-profit corporate guardian-
ship programs is that legislatures and social service agencies do not
perceive the contract failure problem in the guardianship system. Al-
though an incapacitated person is in no position to monitor the quality
of services provided, the guardian is supposedly monitored through
court supervision. In theory, the court's supervisory role compensates
for the loss of the ward's monitoring capabilities.
Although the safeguards of court supervision have at least theoretical
appeal, practice has not born out the merits. Courts generally do not
have the funding or personnel to visit wards or investigate guardians.65
The court's supervisory role is usually limited to proforma approval of
annual financial accountings, and even compliance with this require-
ment is often unenforced.66 Few jurisdictions require any update on
the nonfinancial well-being of the ward.67
The potential for abuse of guardianship authority prompted the
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1627.
65. Frolik, supra note 3, at 43-44 (arguing that judges need to demand more resources
from legislatures for the training and supervision of guardians, as well as a system of court-
appointed visitors for wards).
66. Vicki Gottlich & Erica Wood, Statewide Review of Guardianships: The California
and Maryland Approaches, 23 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 426, 426 (1989) (citing the 1987 investi-
gative report of the Associate Press, which found after a year-long study of 2,200 probate files
that 48% were missing annual financial accountings; and a grand jury investigation in Dade
County, Florida, which found that 75% of the randomly selected probate files were missing
financial reports).
67. Frolik, supra note 3, at 43; but see Gottlich & Wood, supra note 66, at 427-32
(describing statutorily mandated systems in California and Maryland for monitoring
guardianship).
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Subcommittee on Housing and Consumer Interests of the House Select
Committee on Aging to propose model standards in 1988 for programs
providing guardianship and representative payeeship services.68 One of
the Subcommittee's concerns was that corporate guardianship pro-
grams, especially for-profit programs, may result in an overuse of
guardianship for surrogate decision making.69 The Subcommittee
feared that the need for a sufficient number of clients to stay in busi-
ness may promote solicitation of unneeded guardianship, as well as
reluctance to terminate authority over a paying client where guardian-
ship was no longer appropriate. 0 Concern was also raised over what
would happen to the wards of for-profit guardians when the ward's
funds became exhausted. 1
One could argue that a number of the foregoing concerns are also
applicable to nonprofit corporate guardianship programs because, like
their for-profit counterparts, continued viability may depend on having
a sufficient number of clients. However, nonprofits can subsidize the
cost of providing services with donations and grants. Furthermore, the
financial pressure of merely covering operating expenses is far less
than that of meeting proprietary expectations of a profit above and
beyond the break-even point. The fate of wards who run out of money
would also be less problematic in a nonprofit program. When a ward
becomes impoverished, a nonprofit organization that is dedicated to the
mission of providing surrogate decision-making services is far more
likely to continue those services than is a for-profit organization that
cannot justify unprofitable endeavors to its ownership. Thus, although
for-profit guardianship services compete with nonprofit programs in
some jurisdictions, the lack of the ward's ability to monitor the services,
the minimal effectiveness of court supervision, and the vulnerability of
a ward in the event of impoverishment all argue in favor of a prefer-
ence for nonprofit surrogate guardianship programs.
In summary, the traditional guardianship system was based on the
premise that family members or friends would volunteer to act as sur-
rogate decision makers for incapacitated individuals. The failure of this
system to accommodate the rising requirement for surrogates has
placed increasing pressure on government public guardianship pro-
grams and prompted the advent of corporate guardianship programs.
Although for-profit programs exist, several theories help explain the
predominance of and preference for nonprofit programs. First, not only
68. See HOUSE SUBCOMM. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1.
69. Id. at 9, 22.
70. Id. at 22.
71. Id.
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are recipients of surrogate decision-making services unable to monitor
the quality of services received, but court supervision is minimal. The
nonprofit's prohibition on profit distribution reduces the likelihood that
surrogate decision makers will decrease the quality of services offered
in order to increase profits (the contract failure theory). Second, the
inability of government to supply adequate public guardianship ser-
vices may prompt dissatisfied voters to meet unsatisfied public needs
through collective nonprofit enterprise, which is more economically ef-
ficient than isolated individual efforts (the government failure theory).
Third, altruism may also be a driving force that prompts individuals to
identify and respond to the unmet needs of those who cannot help
themselves (the altruism theory). Further, because of the limited cir-
cumstances in which the requirement for surrogate decision making
can be expressed as a marketplace demand (that is, where funds exist
to initiate and maintain payment for services rendered), for-profit pro-
grams have limited utility in meeting the growing requirement for sur-
rogate decision makers.
As the prior discussions demonstrate, despite the advent of corporate
guardianship programs, the present guardianship system will be una-
ble to compensate for rising surrogate decision-making needs and de-
clining availability of individual surrogate decision makers. If the sup-
ply of individual surrogates is inadequate, innovative ways to improve
and expand the role of nonprofit corporate surrogate decision makers
should be explored. Before analyzing the merits of expanding durable
powers authority to include delegation of full powers to nonprofit cor-
porate agents, examples of exemplary nonprofit corporate guardianship
programs will be examined in the next Section. Section IV will then
address how the successful components of nonprofit guardianship pro-
grams could be used as a foundation for expanding durable powers to
provide a guardianship alternative for persons who are without indi-
vidual surrogate decision makers.
III. ANATOMY OF THE PROTOTYPIC NONPROFIT CORPORATE
GUARDIANSHIP PROGRAM
Despite the flurry of interest in guardianship and guardianship re-
form that began in the late 1980s,2 the research on corporate and
agency-based guardianship programs is limited.73 The localized nature
72. See HOUSE SUBCOMM. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1; see also Barnes, supra note
2, at 637; Frolik, supra note 3; Carol A. Mooney, Guardianship Reform: A Federal Mandate,
PROB. & PROP., Mar.-Apr. 1990, at 48.
73. There is no national directory of nonprofit guardianship programs. Interview with
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of guardianship may be one of the primary reasons why so little is
known about how many and what type of corporate guardianship pro-
grams exist. Likewise, because guardianship is subject to state legisla-
tive control, there are no uniform federal standards that apply to the
procedural or substantive aspects of guardianship.74 Federal guardian-
ship reform bills, which would have conditioned states' receipt of cer-
tain federal benefits upon reform compliance, have repeatedly failed."
The following description of a prototypic nonprofit guardianship
program is therefore based on limited studies and anecdotal informa-
tion collected about successful guardianship programs in various parts
of the country. What information is available indicates that nonprofit
guardianship programs tend to fall within three basic categories: gen-
eral social service agency programs, 6 programs devoted to the needs of
developmentally disabled individuals,77 and programs initiated through
cooperative efforts among the public, private, and nonprofit sectors. 8
Marc Greidinger, American Bar Association Commission on Mental & Physical Disability
Law, in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 20, 1994). However, there is a professional association for
guardians of all types known as the National Guardianship Association. See Telephone Inter-
view with Joan Gray, supra note 6.
The goal of a recent study funded by the AARP Andrus Foundation was to determine the
number, capacity, and characteristics of social service agencies that are providing guardianship
services for elderly wards. Of the 359 agencies that responded to the survey, only 52 (14%)
provide guardianship services. ZIMNY & DIAMOND, supra note 1, at 5, 13.
74. See generally Mooney, supra note 72 (describing the relationship of two proposed fed-
eral reform bills to current state regulatory controls); HOUSE SUBCOMM. MODEL STANDARDS,
supra note 1.
75. Three guardianship reform bills (H.R. 5275, S. 2765, and H.R. 5266) were intro-
duced in the 100th Congress, and reintroduced, as amended (H.R. 1702, S. 235, and H.R. 372)
in the 101st Congress. See Mooney, supra note 72, at 48. Although the bills were not enacted,
the later passage of The Patient Self Determination Act of 1990 indicates the power of the
federal government to exact national reform compliance in areas otherwise subject to exclusive
state legislative control. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508,
§§ 4206, 4751, 104 Stat. 1388 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
76. Social service agencies that also provide guardianship services tend to be members of
one of four national umbrella organizations: the Association of Jewish Family and Children's
Agencies, Family Service America, Catholic Charities USA, and the Evangelical Lutheran
Church America. ZIMNY & DIAMOND, supra note 1, at 8.
77. A typical example would be the LIFEguardianship Program operated under the aus-
pices of The Arc of North Carolina, Incorporated. The Arc of N.C., Inc. (formerly the Associa-
tion for Retarded Citizens/North Carolina, Inc.), LIFEguardianship History, Structure, and
Program 4 (unpublished information furnished on October 26, 1994; on file with the University
of Cincinnati Law Review) [hereinafter LIFEguardianship Program]; see also The Arc Nat'l
Headquarters, Future Planning Resources (unpublished information furnished on October 13,
1994, including a state-specific resource guide for guardianship planning materials; on file with
the University of Cincinnati Law Review).
78. See, e.g., Agency Profile: L.E. Phillips Career Dev. Ctr. Corp. Guardianship Program,
Eau Claire, Wis. GUARDIANSHIP SUPPORT CTR. NEWS, Sept. 1994, at 6 (highlighting non-
profit program developed at the joint request of the Eau Claire Department of Human Services
and the Eau Claire County Circuit Court, and funded by the Eau Claire Department of
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The subsequent descriptive profile integrates the best attributes of the
various types of nonprofit guardianship programs as an example of
what is both desirable and possible in a system utilizing nonprofit sur-
rogate decision makers. The program characteristics that will be ex-
amined include: 1) protocol for evaluating the appropriateness of
guardianship; 2) the board or committee system for exercising guardi-
anship authority; 3) systems for managing fiduciary responsibilities; 4)
sources of funding and support; 5) protections against liability; and 6)
use of volunteers for increasing personal contact with wards.
A. Protocol for Evaluating the Appropriateness of Guardianship
Most programs use a number of criteria to determine whether
guardianship of a proposed ward is appropriate and whether the non-
profit entity is well suited to meet the ward's needs. An informal as-
sessment is usually conducted by a social worker/case manager in ad-
dition to the formal medical and psychological evaluations that may be
required."9 Where indicated, alternatives to guardianship are discussed
with the proposed ward. 0 If it is determined that a relative is available
to serve as guardian or that the proposed ward would be better served
by a less restrictive alternative than guardianship (for example, repre-
sentative payeeship or perhaps a drug or alcohol rehabilitation pro-
gram), then the referral for guardianship is declined.81 Some programs
also have financial guidelines for acceptance of a proposed ward,82
Human Services and private fees); see also Rogers, supra note 1, at 3-5 (highlighting, among
others, Guardian, Inc., a nonprofit agency in Battle Creek, Michigan, which was an outgrowth
of the county guardian and is funded through a combination of funds from the county, United
Way, private donations, corporate funds, and fees for service; and Volunteer Guardianship Pro-
grams of Ohio, which are funded by monies from the Indigent Guardianship Fund (generated
by probate filing fees), as well as a variety of other sources including donations from hospitals
and county mental health boards.).
79. See The Arc of N.C., Inc., Guidelines for Referral of Candidates for ARC/NC Corp.
Guardianship (unpublished information furnished on October 26, 1994; on file with the Univer-
sity of Cincinnati Law Review); ZIMNY & DIAMOND, supra note 1, at 36-37, 62, 75-76, 85-87,
100-01, 110-11 (describing the assessment criteria of six nonprofit guardianship programs for
acceptance of wards).
80. See, e.g., ZIMNY & DIAMOND, supra note 1, at 76 (reporting procedures used by
Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of St. Paul and Minneapolis).
81. See supra note 79.
82. ZIMNY & DIAMOND, supra note 1, at 36-37 (noting that Jewish Family Service of Los
Angeles requires a prospective ward to have a minimum of $60,000 in assets to assure that the
ward's expenses will be paid and that the agency will be able to collect its fees for one to one
and one-half years); The Arc of N.C., Inc., Chart II-Admissions Process (Jan. 27, 1994)
(unpublished flowchart furnished on October 26, 1994, indicating that The Arc will not become
a guardian in situations where there are no resources to pay for services; on file with the Uni-
versity of Cincinnati Law Review).
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whereas others accept both indigent and paying clients. Once a ward is
accepted for guardianship services, the program develops a personal-
ized plan for meeting the ward's needs.8 3
B. Board or Committee System for Exercising Guardianship
Authority
A relatively new concept in corporate guardianship is the use of a
board or committee to act as the surrogate decision-making body for
the ward or as an advisor to the individual within the organization
who is carrying out the entity's guardianship responsibilities. 4 The
advantage of a board or committee system for surrogate decision mak-
ing is that multiple perspectives and fields of expertise can inform the
process."8 A multiperspective approach is particularly helpful when
ethical decisions regarding a ward's health care must be made 6 or
technical decisions concerning maximization of a ward's estate are at
issue.87
One distinct advantage of the nonprofit form of corporate guardian-
ship is that it can usually attract volunteer board and committee mem-
bers. Volunteer professionals not only enhance the quality of a pro-
gram's services through their collective expertise, but also may make
possible the provision of services on a reduced cost or pro bono basis to
83. See LIFEguardianship Program, supra note 77, at 6-7.
84. While The Arc of North Carolina, Inc., is the legally-designated guardian for its
wards (identified as "proteges"), the LIFEguardianship Council is authorized by the corpora-
tion's by-laws to be the actual surrogate decision-making body for proteges. The Council is a
diverse group of least 21 members encompassing parents and relatives of developmentally dis-
abled individuals and professionals from the fields of medicine, law, social work, mental retar-
dation, religion, and accounting. Id. at 4-5.
The board or committee concept is also being used in public guardianship programs. In
Idaho, a volunteer board serves as the guardian of last resort. The Board of Community Guard-
ian, appointed by the county board of commissioners, is comprised of 7 to 11 volunteers from
the fields of elder law and social service. Siemon et al., supra note 55, at 597-98. The committee
concept has also been used successfully by the Montgomery County Department of Social Ser-
vices in Maryland. The volunteer ethics committee (originally composed of social workers, a
physician, psychologist, nurse, attorney, the director of the local area agency on aging, a rabbi, a
nurse psychiatrist, an ethicist, and relatives of family members who were eligible for Depart-
ment services) was formed to advise the Director of the Department in his role as public guard-
ian. Jay Kenney & Joan Planell, Ethics Committee 2 (October 21, 1994) (unpublished infor-
mation furnished on October 21, 1994 at the Joint Conference on Law & Aging in Washington,
D.C.; on file with the University of Cincinnati Law Review).
85. See Kenney & Planell, supra note 84, at 2, 4-5.
86. See id. at 1, 3.
87. See ZIMNY & DIAMOND, supra note 1, at 43 (noting that under the procedures of
Jewish Family Service of Los Angeles, the program director can call upon a group of advisors
composed of an attorney, broker, accountant, and any other special resource person needed).
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needy wards. One program has been so successful with its volunteer
ethics committee that there is a waiting list of professionals who are
willing to participate.88
C. Systems for Managing Fiduciary Responsibilities
When a corporate entity is appointed as the conservator or guardian
of the estate, a system needs to be in place for ensuring that the organi-
zation will faithfully meet its fiduciary responsibilities and that accu-
rate records will be maintained of the receipts and disbursements han-
dled on the ward's behalf. Computerized checkbook ledger systems
have made it possible for corporate guardians to keep accurate ac-
counting records of the income and expenditures for numerous wards
and for that information to be easily converted into periodic court re-
ports.8" Notwithstanding the convenience and efficiency of computer-
ization, attention must still be paid to office procedures for protecting
the ward's assets against theft or mismanagement.
The financial security systems of corporate guardianship programs
vary in complexity, 90 but the most security conscious share several
characteristics. One common characteristic is a separation of duties
among the staff who record, endorse, and deposit checks for wards, as
well as for those who approve, record, and sign checks for disburse-
ments to pay the ward's bills.91 With separation of duties, intentional
mismanagement of funds can occur only as a result of collusion among
staff members who exercise complementary functions.
Direct deposit of regular payments to wards is another common
method of reducing security risks,92 as is requiring multiple signatures
for large checks drawn on ward funds.9" To monitor the effectiveness
of the entire system, some programs are audited annually by an outside
accountant, whereas others rely on the internal process of preparing
88. Joan Planell, Remarks at the Joint Conference on Law & Aging in Washington, D.C.
(October 21, 1994).
89. ZIMNY & DIAMOND, supra note 1, at 42, 67, 90, 105, 112, 125 (noting the various
computer software systems used by corporate guardians to track ward receipts and
disbursements).
90. See id. at 42-43, 55-57, 67-70, 79-80, 90-92, 104-06, 112-14, 125-26 (comparing the
procedures of eight different agencies for handling ward's estates).
91. See, e.g., id. at 42-43, 55-56, 126 (noting the separation of duties policies at Jewish
Family Service of Los Angeles, Jewish Association for Services for the Aged, and Family Ser-
vices, Inc.).
92. See id. at 67, 105, 113.
93. See id. at 43, 56 (noting two programs where checks over the amount of $1000 must be
signed by at least two authorized agency officials).
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periodic ward accountings for court review. 94
D. Sources of Funding and Support
The nonprofit status of a corporate guardianship program can be
both a bane and a blessing from the standpoint of funding. According
to Hansmann's contract failure theory, the nondistribution constraint
on profits ostensibly encourages consumers and charitable donors to
place more trust in nonprofit programs than for-profit entities for the
provision of services to the vulnerable and indigent.95 But, when pro-
gram fees and charitable support are inadequate to cover the cost of
services provided, nonprofit entities cannot sell equity shares to raise
money as can their for-profit counterparts. 6 Consequently, nonprofit
guardianship programs must use the advantages of their tax-exempt
status to develop diverse sources of nonproprietary funding for contin-
ued viability.
Possible sources of funding for nonprofit guardianship programs in-
clude: private fees for service, contracts with governmental units (for
example, counties and protective services departments), court-adminis-
tered funds (for example, funds generated by probate filing fees or in-
terest on lawyer's trust accounts), private contracts with hospitals and
nursing homes (usually limited to the costs of initiating guardianship
for patients or residents without family members), agency support (for
example, United Way and religious organizations), donations, and
grants. 7 Although a ward may initially have an estate from which fees
can be paid when guardianship is instituted, these funds are often de-
pleted by expensive custodial or health care.98 Because it is the policy
of most nonprofit programs to continue services for wards who have
exhausted their funds,99 supplementary sources of funding are crucial.
94. Id. at 56, 79, 91, 113, 126 (describing the control and oversight policies of various
agencies).
95. See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
96. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
97. See ZIMNY & DIAMOND, supra note 1, at 33-34, 44, 58-59, 71-72, 81-82, 92-93, 107-
08, 114-115, 129-31 (summarizing funding sources for eight nonprofit guardianship programs);
see also Rogers, supra note 1, at 3 (noting the flexibility of the nonprofit form of guardianship
program for soliciting funds from a variety of sources).
98. See supra note 54.
99. See, e.g., ZIMNY & DIAMOND, supra note 1, at 44, 131 (indicating that the policies of
Jewish Family Service of Los Angeles and Family Services, Inc., are to continue services for
wards whose funds have become depleted).
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E. Protections Against Liability
Another critical component to the viability of nonprofit corporate
guardianship programs is adequate protection against liability. Liabil-
ity issues arise with respect to the conduct of directors, officers, em-
ployees, and volunteers, as well as in connection with property owned
by the corporation and its wards. In addition to minimizing potential
liabilities through security and safety-oriented office procedures,100
three types of protection are available for nonprofit corporate guardi-
ans and their constituents: insurance, surety bonds, and volunteer pro-
tection laws.
The following are examples of insurable risks for which a corporate
guardian may seek protection: 1) injuries to wards, volunteers, employ-
ees, or third parties; 2) exposure of directors and officers to liability for
their own errors and omissions or the acts of other corporate agents;
and 3) theft of or damage to property belonging to the ward or
corporation.
Most guardianship programs have general liability and casualty pol-
icies that cover injuries to person and property. 1 ' Additionally, a
number of corporate guardians carry professional liability or malprac-
tice insurance for the activities of professional staff,10 2 a worker's com-
pensation policy for employee injuries, and an accidental injury and
death policy for volunteers.' 03 Directors' and officers' liability insur-
ance is available for errors and omissions, as is theft and employee
dishonesty coverage for loss of corporate or ward property.' 4 Pro-
grams may also purchase excess auto liability insurance when employ-
ees or volunteers drive personal automobiles on guardianship busi-
ness.' 5 As a final measure of protection, an umbrella excess liability
policy can insure against liabilities that fall between the parameters of
other coverages.' 06
Notwithstanding applicable insurance coverages, ward assets are
also protected by statutory bond requirements for guardians. A typical
bond amount is equal to the aggregate value of the property in the
guardian's control plus one year's estimated income from the property
100. See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
101. See ZIMNY & DIAMOND, supra note 1, at 43, 70, 106 (mentioning examples of pro-
grams with general liability policies).
102. Id. at 70 (describing a $1,000,000 professional liability policy obtained from the Na-
tional Association of Social Workers).
103. Id. at 81.
104. Id. at 114.
105. See id. at 81, 97 (explaining the benefits of excess auto liability insurance).
106. Id.
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less the value of assets that cannot be sold or conveyed without court
approval. 10 7 Because most bonds are subject to a minimum bond pre-
mium, wards with small estates may pay proportionately higher bond
fees than those with larger estates. With the advent of corporate guard-
ianship programs, some states are permitting umbrella bonding so that
a corporate guardian can purchase one large bond to cover a number
of small estates.' 08
A third form of liability protection, volunteer protection legislation,
is also available to some degree in every state.'0 9 Although statutes
vary by jurisdiction, volunteer protection laws usually shield noncom-
pensated"O directors, officers, and other volunteers of nonprofit organi-
zations from specified types of liability. Immunity from liability is
based on a statutory standard of conduct. The broadest protection is
afforded by statutes that shield all but intentional, willful, or wanton
acts."' Lesser standards may be based on recklessness or gross
negligence." 2
In addition to different standards of liability, statutes also vary with
respect to exclusions from protection. A common exclusion from pro-
tection is liability for motor vehicle accidents.'" Other typical exclu-
sions include injuries for which the volunteer or organization is in-
sured." 4 Although volunteer protection statutes shield individual
107. See, e.g., UGPPA, supra note 49, § 2-310.
108. See ZIMNY & DIAMOND, supra note 1, at 58.
109. See generally Charles Tremper, Liability for Volunteers of Charitable, Religious and
Nonprofit Organizations, in TORT LIABILITY FOR CHARITABLE, RELIGIOUS AND NON-PROFIT
INSTITUTIONS pt. A, at 4 (A.B.A. Sec. Tort & Ins. Prac. ed., 1992).
110. Most, but not all statutes require that an individual be a noncompensated director,
officer, or volunteer to qualify for immunity from liability. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 317A.257(1) (West Supp. 1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41.485(1), (3)(c) (1996); Wyo.
STAT. § 1-1-125 (Supp. 1995); cf. TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-58-601(c) (1995) (granting immu-
nity to members of nonprofit boards whether compensated or not). Compensation, however, for
purposes of statutory immunity does not include reimbursement for actual expenses incurred.
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 317A.257(3)(1) (West Supp. 1995); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 41.485(3)(c) (1996); WYO. STAT. § 1-1-125(a)(i) (Supp. 1995).
111. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-20 (Michie Supp. 1995) (willful or wanton miscon-
duct); IOWA CODE ANN. § 613.19 (West Supp. 1995) (intentional misconduct); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-3601(b)(1) (1994) (willful, wanton, or intentionally tortious conduct).
112. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 317.257(1) (West Supp. 1995) (willful or reckless
misconduct); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 84.007(a) (West Supp. 1996) (acts or
omissions that are "intentional, wilfully or wantonly negligent, or done with conscious indiffer-
ence or reckless disregard"); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-982 (West Supp. 1994) (willful,
wanton, or grossly negligent misconduct); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8133(d) (Supp. 1994)
(willful, wanton, or grossly negligent conduct).
113. See, e.g., MIss. CODE ANN. § 95-9-1(3)(b) (1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-7.1(b)
(West Supp. 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-19-2(2)(a) (1992).
114. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3601(b)(2) (1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.10(b)
(Supp. 1995).
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volunteers, the organization itself is not protected from liability under
such laws." 5
Volunteer protection laws were intended to encourage volunteerism
by decreasing exposure to liability and costs of insurance;" 6 however,
there appears to be no appreciable decline in the use of insurance by
nonprofit organizations."' The reasons that volunteer protection laws
have not decreased the need for insurance are two-fold. First, the ex-
tent of protection is uncertain because few statutes have been chal-
lenged or invoked in litigation;" 8 and second, insurance is still neces-
sary to provide volunteer defense costs and to protect the
organization.' 9 Of course, it is unknown how many potential liability
suits may have actually been deterred by the existence of volunteer
protection laws.
F. Use of Volunteers for Increasing Personal Contact with Wards
The issue of volunteer liability and protection is one of many that
impact a nonprofit corporate guardian's ability to recruit and retain
volunteers. The effective use of volunteers is a key attribute of a proto-
typic nonprofit corporate guardianship program. Nonprofit guardians
can attract the support of volunteers principally because of their non-
profit status and worthy mission. It is difficult to imagine the willing-
ness of volunteers to donate their time to a for-profit program so that
the proprietor could generate a larger profit.
Volunteers presently serve nonprofit guardianship programs in a
number of valuable capacities. These include service on advisory
boards and committees,120 as office staff,'' and most importantly, as
regular visitors to wards.' 22 By maintaining regular contact with
wards, volunteers become the heart and hands of the corporate person,
providing the personal touch that might otherwise be lost in institu-
tional guardianship.
115. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3601(d) (1994); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.485(2)
(1996); Wvo. STAT. § 1-1-125(d) (Supp. 1995).
116. See, e.g., TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 84.002(7) (West Supp. 1996) (cit-
ing purpose of act as reducing "the liability exposure and insurance costs of these [charitable]
organizations and their employees and volunteers in order to encourage volunteer services and
maximize the resources devoted to delivering these services").
117. See supra notes 101-06 and accompanying text.
118. Tremper, supra note 109, pt. A, at 23.
119. Id. pt. A, at 13, 23.
120. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
121. See, e.g., ZIMNY & DIAMOND, supra note 1, at 82-83 (noting program where volun-
teers are used to do tax reports and bookkeeping).
122. See id. at 94-97; see also Rogers, supra note 1.
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Although well-established volunteer programs are one of the most
cost-effective ways to provide needed services in a nonprofit guardian-
ship program, the recruitment, training, and supervision of volunteers
requires an ongoing commitment on the part of the organization's reg-
ular staff.12 3 To be effective, volunteers must serve an integrated func-
tion in the program with direct channels of communication to other
staff members. 24 Regular ward visits not only provide the care and
concern desperately needed by incapacitated persons, but also serve a
monitoring function essential to responsible guardianship.
As the foregoing profile of the prototypic nonprofit corporate guardi-
anship program demonstrates, personal attention, fiduciary accounta-
bility, and conscientious decision making do not have to be sacrificed
when an incapacitated person is served by a corporate, rather than an
individual, guardian. In fact, when an appropriate individual is un-
available to serve, a number of factors support nonprofit corporations
as the alternative of choice.
First, the contract failure, government failure, and altruism theories
suggest that the nonprofit form of enterprise will be more responsive to
the needs of vulnerable wards than will for-profit entities. Taken in
combination, these theories support the conclusion that nonprofits are
best suited to respond to societal needs that remain unmet by the gov-
ernment and private sectors (for example, the needs of those who are
indigent and left unserved by the commercial marketplace or govern-
ment programs such as public guardianship), as well as the demands
of consumers who are unable to monitor the quality of the service pro-
vided (for example, the inherent condition of the incapacitated con-
sumer of surrogate decision-making services). Second, although fund-
ing may be problematic for nonprofit programs, their tax-exempt
nonprofit status does enable them to attract grants, donations, and gov-
ernment contracts that are unavailable to for-profit programs. Third,
the incentives for volunteer support are also greater in nonprofit pro-
grams because volunteers know that the incapacitated wards, rather
than profiteering proprietors, are benefiting from their altruistic contri-
bution of personal time and effort.
The final question then that must be addressed is whether the inter-
ests of society in general, and incapacitated persons in particular,
would be enhanced by permitting competent individuals to appoint
nonprofit corporations as agents under durable powers. In the present
system, persons without appropriate individual agents are left with no
123. See, e.g., ZIMNY & DIAMOND, supra note 1, at 95-97.
124. See id.; Rogers, supra note 1, at 10.
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option other than judicial determination of their fate through guardi-
anship proceedings. Simply put, should there be an alternative for such
persons?
IV. THE CASE FOR DELEGATING DURABLE POWERS TO
NONPROFIT CORPORATE AGENTS
Any system of care for the incapacitated must strike a delicate bal-
ance between protection of the individual and preservation of the indi-
vidual's autonomy. The inherent tension between protection and au-
tonomy presents a dilemma for legislators. A measure taken to increase
protection is, of necessity, also one that decreases autonomy. Tradi-
tional plenary guardianship, for example, is both the most protective 2 5
and the most restrictive form of surrogate decision making. The legal
process that vests the guardian with protective powers over the ward's
property and person also divests the ward of even nondelegable powers
such as the right to vote or marry.'2 6 Durable powers were created, in
part, as a reaction to the stringent consequences of guardianship.
Implicit in durable powers legislation is the trade-off of protective
court supervision for the autonomy of privately choosing one's own
surrogate and the scope of authority to be delegated. An indication of
our culture's high regard for personal autonomy is the adoption by
every jurisdiction of durable powers legislation, 2 ' as well as the enact-
ment by Congress of The Patient Self-Determination Act of 1990.118
This act requires all Medicare and Medicaid provider organizations to
inform patients of their respective state-law rights to make health-care
decisions and to formulate advance directives for surrogate decision
making.121 If self-determination is one of the paramount societal val-
ues, should this privilege hang by so slender a thread as the availability
of family or friends to serve as surrogate decision makers?
Based on the demographic predictions for the twenty-first century,
society will be forced to answer this question as the number of inca-
pacitated persons increases and the number of available individual sur-
125. Of course the protective quality of guardianship presumes that the court is perform-
ing an effective supervisory role. But see sources cited supra notes 65-67.
126. See Mooney, supra note 72, at 48 (noting that "most guardianship orders remove
such basic rights as the rights to vote, own property, marry, consent to medical treatment and
contract").
127. See sources cited in Whitton, supra note 4, at 40-41, 46.
128. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, §§ 4206, 4751,
104 Stat. 1388 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
129. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1395cc(f), 1396a(w) (Supp. 1995).
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rogates declines.' 3 ' Already the growing shortage of volunteer surro-
gate decision makers has impacted probate courts, social service
agencies, and public guardianship programs.' If a corporate or public
guardian will be the only alternative for an incapacitated person, the
interests of personal autonomy and economic efficiency argue in favor
of allowing that individual, while still competent, to investigate the op-
tions for corporate surrogate decision making and to exercise the privi-
lege of self-determination with respect to those options.
As the subsequent analysis will demonstrate, advance delegation of
durable powers to nonprofit corporate agents could make the privilege
of self-determination an equal opportunity proposition without sacri-
ficing society's interest in protecting the vulnerable and incapacitated.
The interests of society and incapacitated persons could benefit in sev-
eral ways from the private delegation of durable powers to nonprofit
corporate agents. First, more comprehensive use of durable powers
would reduce the burden placed on public and judicial resources by
guardianship proceedings. Second, advance delegation of durable pow-
ers to nonprofit corporate agents could improve the quality and availa-
bility of surrogate decision-making services. Third, nonprofit corporate
surrogate programs could provide an economically efficient means to
combine scarce public and private funding for maximum program
effectiveness.
A. Reducing the Burden of Guardianship on Public and Judicial
Resources
Permitting delegation of durable powers to nonprofit corporate
agents is only one of several necessary components in a multi-faceted
approach to reducing guardianship burdens on public and judicial re-
sources. The primary reason individuals become respondents in guard-
ianship proceedings is a failure to plan for the possibility of incapacita-
tion. Failure to plan may be the result of procrastination, denial, lack
of education about surrogate decision making, or lack of access to legal
services for document preparation.' An effective program to address
the increased need for surrogate decision makers must therefore begin
with a commitment to public education and access to legal services.
130. See supra notes 7-29 and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
132. See Charles P. Sabatino, Surrogate Decision-Making in Health Care: A Legislative
Overview, BIOETHICS BULL., Summer 1993, at 1, 2 (noting that "[d]espite the statutory recogni-
tion of health-care powers of attorney nationally . . . [i]t is estimated that only about 15% of
Americans have executed any sort of written medical directive").
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Public education programs concerning surrogate decision making
could be co-sponsored by bar associations, the public guardian's office,
hospitals, and nonprofit corporate surrogates. Bar associations could
also address the issue of access to legal services by initiating pro bono
seminars for preparation of advance directives. Advance directives are
neither difficult nor time-consuming to prepare and would therefore
present an ideal way for attorneys to perform pro bono work without
incurring long-term representational responsibilities to pro bono cli-
ents. Law school clinics would be another appropriate medium for ed-
ucating the public about surrogate decision making and providing the
necessary legal documentation.
As part of the education process, individuals could also be counseled
on the importance of selecting trustworthy agents for delegation of du-
rable powers and about the existence of professional nonprofit surro-
gates who could serve in the event that appropriate individual agents
were not available. Clients who were interested in nonprofit surrogate
decision-making services could then interview provider organizations to
determine what type of organization would best meet their needs.
Through education, access to legal services, and the availability of non-
profit corporate surrogates, persons who might have otherwise fallen to
the guardianship system would have the opportunity to make informed
choices about their future care without burdening public or judicial
resources.
B. Improving the Quality and Availability of Surrogate Decision-
Making Services
For individuals who do not have appropriate family members or
friends to act as their surrogates, a well-established nonprofit corporate
surrogate program may actually provide better quality surrogate deci-
sion-making services than an individual agent who lacks the experi-
ence, skill, or interest. Nonprofit corporate guardianship programs
would be ideal candidates for appointment under durable powers be-
cause they already have staff trained for assessing and visiting incapac-
itated clients, and systems in place for principled decision making and
fiduciary accountability. In addition, private delegation of durable
powers before incapacitation permits an opportunity for the corporate
agent to ascertain from the principal what personal beliefs, values, and
preferences should inform the surrogate decision-making process.
Another advantage of nonprofit corporate surrogates serving under
durable powers rather than guardianship is that surrogate decision
making via durable powers carries with it less stigma for the incapaci-
tated person. Court adjudication of incapacitation is not required to
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activate springing powers' 33 in a durable power of attorney, and the
principal suffers no termination of nondelegable legal rights. Activation
of durable powers can be safeguarded, however, by requiring protec-
tive triggering mechanisms, such as concurring opinions about the
principal's incapacitation by two physicians or by one physician and
one psychologist. The principal, by choosing the terms and conditions
of the agency relationship while still competent, plays a proactive role
in creating a plan of care that maximizes desired autonomy while pro-
viding necessary protection.
C. Combining Public and Private Funding for Maximum Program
Effectiveness
Of course, the ability of nonprofit corporate programs to fill unmet
needs for surrogate decision makers will depend in large part on ade-
quate funding. Permitting corporations to serve as privately delegated
agents under durable powers may increase the fee-for-service base of
corporate guardianship programs, but nonprofit corporate surrogates
will still need a dependable mix of non-fee financial support due to the
number of persons who are indigent or have small estates at the time
of incapacitation. As noted earlier, nonprofit guardianship programs
currently draw from a variety of funding sources, including contracts
with governmental units, court-administered funds, agency support,
donations, and grants."" The ability to attract funds from other pri-
vate and nonprofit sources is particularly crucial during this era of
federal budget cuts.'3 5
Federal funding cutbacks tend to affect nonprofit organizations from
two directions. First, when government reduces funding for services
that are provided by the government as well as by the nonprofit sector
(for example, public guardianship services), the demand for services
133. Durable powers can be either immediate or springing. If immediate, and the princi-
pal retains competency, the principal and agent will have coextensive authority with respect to
all property powers, but the agent's health-care powers will remain unexerciseable as long as
the principal is competent. A springing power, on the other hand, does not become effective
until the principal's incapacity or a designated triggering event. Springing powers are often
preferred by clients because they allow the principal to retain sole authority over person and
property while competent, but protect against the need for guardianship in the event of later
incapacity. See COLLIN ET AL., supra note 53, at 9-10.
134. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
135. See Jackie Calmes & Christopher Georges, House Approves Bill to Balance Budget,
Lower Taxes and Cut Role of Government-Senate Expected to Clear Its Version Today;
GOP Faces Tough Bargaining, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 1995, at A3 (reporting on the progress of
the Republican-dominated 104th Congress and its "Contract with America" to balance the
budget and cut government spending).
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from nonprofit providers increases."' 8 Second, government reduction of
funding for subsidized nonprofit services (for example, contract guardi-
anship services to the indigent) reduces the nonprofit's financial re-
sources for meeting both the already existing need for services as well
as the now expanding need caused by the reduction in government-
provided services.137 In light of the likely "double-crunch" effect of
current federal budget cuts on nonprofit providers of services to the
incapacitated, creative public-private funding collaborations will be es-
sential to the continued viability of nonprofit surrogate decision-mak-
ing programs.
A recent study of national grantmaking trends in the field of aging
was conducted to predict what programs will attract future funding."8"
Currently, grantmakers view the funding of community-based support
services and health programs as the highest priority, especially those
programs that provide direct service or education and training."3 9 Pro-
grams that address problems which affect a broad spectrum of age
groups are also favored.140 From the perspective of the grantmakers,
their primary role is to encourage the testing of innovative ideas. 1"
Nonprofit corporate surrogate programs could be ideally situated to
attract such new project grants with the collaborative support of local
governments, courts, and community agencies. These programs are
community-based, provide direct service, and can respond to the needs
of incapacitated persons of all ages. The innovation of expanding cor-
porate guardian programs to include services based on advance delega-
tion of durable powers also has the appeal of offering community sav-
ings in terms of public and judicial resources, as well as affording the
opportunity of self-determination to persons whose destinies may oth-
erwise be determined by public guardianship. Grantmakers are at-
tracted to projects where grant dollars can be leveraged by other public
and private support such as that already available to nonprofit corpo-
rate guardians from local government offices, court administered funds,
and health-care providers. Lastly, public education with respect to ad-
vance planning for incapacitation is also congruent with the types of
goals currently funded by grantmakers.
136. LESTER M. SALAMON & ALAN J. ABRAMSON, THE FEDERAL BUDGET AND THE
NONPROFIT SECTOR 3 (1982).
137. Id.
138. GREENBERG ET AL., AGING-THE BURDEN STUDY OF FOUNDATION GRANTMAK-
ING TRENDS 13-16 (Loren Renz ed., 1991).
139. Id. at 12.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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D. The Role of Legislative Reform
The development of innovative surrogate decision-making services
by nonprofit providers will depend not only upon joint initiatives with
the public and private sectors, but also upon support from state legisla-
tures. At present, many states exclude corporations from eligibility as
agents under durable health-care powers and provisions for medical
agent appointment.14 Although these statutes may reflect a prior pub-
lic concern with the propriety of giving health-care authority to imper-
sonal corporate entities, the present reality of corporate guardianship
programs indicates that health-care decision making by corporate bod-
ies is gaining in acceptability. In fact, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
has held that a corporate guardian may even consent to the withhold-
ing or withdrawal of a ward's life-sustaining medical treatment with-
out prior court approval, provided that certain conditions are met.'4"
The necessity of legislative reform to permit delegation of durable
health-care and medical agent powers to nonprofit corporations gives
legislatures the opportunity to attach whatever limitations and condi-
tions to this statutory privilege they deem necessary for the protection
of their citizenry. What subjective value judgments should be made in
this regard are beyond the scope of this Article. The range of possibili-
ties for legislative reform is broad enough to satisfy the most protection
or autonomy conscious concerns. If autonomy is the prevailing concern,
legislators can place nonprofit corporate agents on par with individual
agents and require no additional safeguards. If, however, protection is
142. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3201(1) (1993) (agent means an "adult"); IND.
CODE ANN. § 16-36-1-2 (Burns 1993) (health-care representative means an "individual");
IOWA CODE ANN. § 144B.1(1) (West Supp. 1995) (attorney-in-fact means an "individual");
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 201D, § 1 (Law Co-op. 1994) (health-care agent means an "adult");
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.496(1) (West 1995) (patient advocate must be "person who is
18 years of age or older"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-J:1 (Michie Supp. 1994) (agent means
an "adult"); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-55 (West Supp. 1995) (health-care representative
must be a "competent adult"); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2980(5) (McKinney 1993) (agent is
an "adult"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.5-02(1) (Supp. 1995) (agent means an "adult"); OR.
REV. STAT. § 127.505(2) (1990) (attorney-in-fact means an "adult"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-5-
504(A)(1) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1995) (agent means an "individual"); TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 135.001 (West Supp. 1996) (agent means an "adult"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14,
§ 3452(1) (1989) (agent means an "adult"); Wts. STAT. ANN. § 155.01(4) (West Supp. 1995)
(health-care agent is an "individual").
143. In re Guardianship of L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60, 71-73 (Wis. 1992) (holding that when
an incompetent patient has been determined with reasonable medical certainty to be in a persis-
tent vegetative state with no reasonable chance of recovery to a sentient and cognitive life, the
guardian may consent to the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment if to do so is
in the best interests of the ward as determined by objective criteria such as the risks and benefits
of various treatment options and the degree of humiliation, dependence, and loss of dignity
likely to result from the condition and treatment).
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the predominate concern, legislators can enact regulations or a code of
conduct to govern corporate surrogate decision makers.144 There are, of
course, endless permutations of protection/autonomy trade-offs be-
tween these two extremes. The more immediate task for legislators,
local governments, courts, social service agencies, health-care providers,
and nonprofit guardians is to find ways of raising social consciousness
about the growing need for surrogate decision makers and the present
inadequacy of our resources to meet that need. Dialogue will be the
beginning point from which initiatives for demonstration projects and
programs develop.
V. CONCLUSION
As we enter the twenty-first century, the growing needs of our aging
society will necessitate greater cooperation among the public, private,
and nonprofit sectors to maximize efficient use of limited community
resources. An area overdue for collaborative reform is our present sys-
tem of care for the incapacitated. With increasing frequency, individu-
als fall subject to public guardianship because they did not plan for
incapacitation and have no family or friends who can serve as volun-
teer surrogates. Improving public education and access with respect to
advance directives is a partial solution to this problem, but alternative
sources of surrogate decision makers are also needed. One answer is
legislative reform to permit the delegation of durable property and
health-care powers to nonprofit corporate agents when individual
agents are unavailable. Nonprofit corporate guardianship programs
have demonstrated the ability of corporate surrogates to provide ser-
vices in a caring, principled, and financially responsible manner. In-
creased access to both advance directives and skilled surrogate decision
makers will not only enhance individual interests in self-determination,
but also further society's interests in providing appropriate care for
those who can no longer care for themselves.
144. See, e.g., supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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